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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:
Case No* 20050134-SC

GRAHAM AUSTIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-18a-l (1) (a) and Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this
appeal from the Judgment
Prison

and Commitment

to

the

Utah

State

entered February 4, 2005, in this case involving

convictions of Murder, a first degree felony; Aggravated
Robbery,

a

second

degree

felony;

and

Interference

with

Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdeameanor from a court of
record.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

ISSUE I: Did the
presented

"reasonable
doubt" jury
at trial correctly
state

instruction
the law?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a jury instruction correctly
states the law is review able under a correction of error
standard, with no particular deference given to the trial
court's ruling.
841, citing
1993).

State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 1 14, 84 P.3d

State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah
Determining

the propriety

of the instructions

submitted to the jury presents a question of law, which this
Court reviews for correctness.

Id.

at 1 15, see, Ames v.

Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993).

ISSUE II: Did the trial court exceed the scope of its
authority
in arbitrarily
and capriciously
sentencing Defendant to consecutive terms
without
the
benefit
of
a presentence
investigation report?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's sentencing decision
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lehman, 2004
UT App. 404. This Court traditionally affords the trial court
wide latitude and discretion in sentencing.
2002 UT 12 18, 40 P. 3d 626.

State v. Helms,

"A trial court abuses its

discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it fails to
consider all legally relevant factors." Id. At 18 (quotations
and citation omitted). Specifically, a trial court abuses its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if "no
reasonable [person] would take the view by the [sentencing]
2

court."

State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f 12, 84 P. 3d

854 (alterations in original) {quoting

State v. Gerrard, 584

P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401, a trial court has
the

discretion

to

impose

consecutive

sentences

when

a

defendant has been convicted of more than one felony offense.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-401 (1) (2000).
trial court may

impose consecutive

However, before a

sentences, it "shall

consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the
history,

character,

defendant."

and

rehabilitative

Id § 76-3-401(2).

needs

of

the

The defendant has the burden

to demonstrate that the trial court did not consider the
factors set forth in § 76-3-401(2).

Helms at 116.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMEND. VI
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 7
UTAH CODE ANN. §7 6-3-4

01

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 9, 2004, Walter Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") was
allegedly stabbed to death in his truck and camper by Graham
Austin (hereinafter "Austin") on River Road.

Tr. Vol. I at

pp.62,

four

63.

Ms. Heather Meacham
3

and

her

children

allegedly witnessed the murder on their way to a graduation in
Colorado.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 72.

Ms. Meacham testified that

they were pursued by Austin in Pratt's truck.
p. 78.

Tr. Vol. I at

She testified that she passed Lucinda and Thomas

Collins (the "Collinses") by the side of the road and stopped
to tell them that she and her children had witnessed some type
of assault and that the suspect was coming down the road. Tr.
Vol. I p. 79.

Ms. Meacham warned the Collinses, that they

might be in danger and that they should leave, then drove
Id.

away.

The Collinses testified that they got into their car and
saw the truck and camper come barreling down the road.

Tr.

Vol. I at p. 129. They testified that they followed Austin to
the highway, were able to get in front of him, get his license
plate and vehicle description and call it into the highway
patrol.

Tr. Vol. I at pp. 129, 130.

They then stop at mile

marker 10 in Colorado and the truck and camper never come pass
them.

Tr. Vol. I at pp. 130, 131.

At this time, Officer Andy Peterson and Officer Darrell
Meacham (hereinafter "Officer Meacham")begin searching for the
victim's vehicle.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 148.

Officer Peterson

testified that he headed down the Pipeline Road, spotted what

4

appeared to be dual wheel tracks, and came upon the truck and
camper.

Id.

Officer Peterson testified that he observed

Austin getting out of the vehicle, that he called out to
Austin and informed him that he was a police officer and to
stop, but that Austin did not respond to his command and took
off on foot. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 150, 151.
Officers Peterson and Meacham testified they followed
Austin to a culvert.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 151.

They discovered

Austin under a tree and order him to come out.

Id.

Austin

would not come out voluntarily so Officer Peterson pulled him
out by his feet.

Tr. Vol. I

at p. 153.

Officer Peterson

testified that he then frisked Austin and found a bloody knife
in his pocket.

Id.

Once Austin was arrested, Officer

Peterson handcuffed him and took him to Officer Manson's
vehicle with the Grand County Sheriff's Department. Tr. Vol.
I at p. 157.
On May 17, 2004, Austin was charged by Information with
Murder, a First-Degree Felony. R001-R002. On June 16, 2004,
in an Amended Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a
First-Degree

Felony;

Aggravated

Robbery,

a

First-Degree

Felony; Obstruction of Justice, a Second Degree Felony, and
Interference with an Arresting Officer; a Class B Misdemeanor.

5

R038-040.

On

January

27,

2005,

in

a

Second

Amended

Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a First-Degree
Felony;

Aggravated

Robbery,

a

First-Degree

Felony;

and

Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.
R0111-R0113.
On February 2, 3, and 4, 2005, this matter came for trial
before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson.
p. 6.

Tr. Vol. I and II at

On February 4, 2005, Austin was found guilty of First-

Degree Murder, Theft

of an Operable Motor Vehicle, and

Interference with an Arresting Officer. Tr. Vol. II at p.157.
Austin waived his right to delay sentencing and on February 4,
2005, was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State
Prison on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, with a
consecutive term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison
for Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle and six months on the
Interference with an Arresting Officer charge. Tr. Vol. II at
p. 172. On February 4, 2005, this Court entered its
and

Commitment

to

Utah

State

Prison,

(hereinafter

"Judgement") in this matter (R0177-R0181).
2005 Austin filed his Notice

of

Appeal

the

On February 10,

from the Judgement

entered with respect to this matter. (R0182-R0183).

6

Judgement

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 9, 2004, Walter Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") was
allegedly stabbed to death in his truck and camper by Graham
Austin (hereinafter "Austin") on River Road,

Tr. Vol. I at

pp.62,

four children

63.

Ms. Heather Meacham

and her

allegedly witnessed the murder on their way to a graduation in
Colorado. Tr. Vol. I at p.72. Ms. Meacham testified that she
witnessed Austin pulling Pratt out of the truck and thought
that Pratt was having a heart attack and slowed down to offer
help with CPR; however, as she slowed down, she realized that
she was witnessing an assault and drove away.

Tr. Vol. I at

pp. 75-76.
As Ms. Meacham drove away she testified that she glanced
in the rear view mirror and noticed Austin walking back across
the street and Pratt's body on the side of the road hunched
over in the sagebrush. Id.

As she drove eastbound, she

glanced in her rear view mirror a few miles down the road and
saw Austin right behind her in Pratt's truck, so she sped up
trying to get away from Austin.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 78.

She

testified that she passed another vehicle on the road and
Austin followed right behind.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 78.

7

Ms. Meacham testified that, as she approached the turnoff to Cisco that leads to 1-70, she no longer saw Austin
Id.

behind her.

She testified that she drove by the

Collinses on the side of the road and that she stopped and
told them that she and her children have witnessed some type
of assault and that the suspect is coming down the road. Tr.
Vol. I p. 79.

She testified that she warned the Collinses

that they may be in danger and that they should leave.

Id.

The Collinses testified that they get into their car and
saw the truck and camper come barreling down the road.
Vol. I at p. 129.

Tr.

They testified that they began following

Austin, were able to pass him, obtained his license plate and
vehicle description and informed the highway patrol. Tr. Vol.
I at pp. 129, 130. The Collinses then stopped at mile marker
10 in Colorado and waited for the truck to drive by, but it
never did. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 130, 131.
During

this

time,

Mr.

Chris

Garland

("Garland") ,

testified that he drove upon the crime scene and saw Pratt
stagger across the road, from what appeared to be in front of
his vehicle.

Tr. Vol. I

at pp.

103, 104, 105.

Garland

testified that he approached Pratt to see if he was okay but
could not get any response from him.

8

Tr. Vol. I at p. 104.

Garland testified that he then walked back to his vehicle and
dialed 911 on his cell phone, and reported to 911 dispatch
what he thought was a hit and run.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 105.

Mr. David Brown ("Brown") testified that he was on his
way to work when he came upon the scene at which Garland was
on his cell phone.

Tr. Vol. I pp. 110, 111.

Seeing Garland

on his cell phone in the middle of the road, Brown testified
that he thought the situation was under control.

Id.

As

Brown drove past, however, he testified that he noticed
Pratt's body on the side of the road, so he came back and
approached Garland, who was still on his cell phone with the
Sheriff's Office.

Tr. Vol. I. P. 111.

The Sheriff's Office dispatcher asked Garland to see if
Pratt was still breathing.

Tr. Vol. I

at p. 112.

Garland

testified that he did not know how to do this and asked Brown
if he would.

Id.

Brown testified that he rolled Pratt over,

checked for a pulse, and tried to get an airway open.

Brown

testified that he could not find a pulse and he discovered
that Pratt's eyes were fixed and dilated.
113.

Tr. Vol. I at p.

Brown testified that he then told Garland to inform the

dispatcher that Pratt was dead and they would not need an
ambulance. Tr. Vol. I at p. 114. Brown testified that he then

9

realized they could be in the middle of a murder scene, and
told Garland not to touch anything and wait for the Sheriff
and highway patrol to arrive.

Id.

Officer Louis Manson ("Manson") who is with the Sheriff's
department testified that he arrived on the scene and saw
three vehicles on the side of the road and the victim on the
left shoulder.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 116.

He testified that he

checked the victim and found no pulse, and then spoke with the
witnesses.

Id.

One of the cars on the side of the road was

a red Ford and it did not belong to either of the witnesses.
Id.

Manson testified that he checked the plates of the Ford

and found it registered to Graham Austin of Clifton, Colorado.
Manson also testified that he discovered from the victim's
driver's license that his name was Walter Pratt of South
Dakota.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 117.

Manson testified that he checked Pratt for signs of
trauma to see if it was a hit and run accident and discovered
stab wounds. Manson testified that he informed dispatch that
they had a homicide and asked for detectives to be sent to the
scene.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 118.

Manson testified that he then

took statements from the witnesses.

10

Id.

As the homicide scene is being secured, Officer Andy
Peterson, (hereinafter "Peterson") a highway patrol trooper
testified that he was called out to help locate the victim's
vehicle.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 145.

Peterson testified that, as

he began his search, he heard over the radio that it was a
homicide case and not a hit and run.
information

Id.

He received

that the victim's vehicle is headed towards

Colorado, and that it had been followed by a couple who are
stopped at Mile marker 10 and have not yet seen the vehicle
drive by.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 146.

Peterson testified that he met up with Officer Darrell
Meacham (hereinafter "Officer Meacham") and they proceeded in
opposite directions looking for the victim's vehicle.
Vol. I at p. 148.

Tr.

Peterson testified that he began looking

for the camper and truck and headed to an area that was well
known to him where many campers go.

Peterson testified he

met up with what is known as the Pipeline Road and spotted
what appeared to be dual wheel tracks. Tr. Vol. I at p. 14 9.
Having received information that the victim's vehicle was a
one-ton pickup truck with a camper on it, Peterson testified
that he proceeded down the road and came upon the truck and
camper.

Id.

Peterson testified that he then informed

11

dispatch and Officer Meacham that he had found the suspect
vehicle.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 150

While Peterson was waiting for the arrival of Officer
Meacham, he testified that Austin got out of the truck. Tr.
Vol. I at p. 150.

Peterson testified that he called out to

Austin, informed him that he was a police officer, and
commanded him to stop.

Tr. Vol. I at pp. 150, 151. Peterson

testified that Austin did not respond to his command, and took
off on foot. Id.
Once Officer Meacham arrived, he testified that he and
Officer Peterson proceeded to follow Austin down a trail to a
culvert.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 151.

Officer Meacham testified

that he discovered Austin on the opposite of the culvert under
a tree and ordered him to come out.

Id.

Officer Meacham

testified that Austin refused to come out voluntarily so
Officer Peterson pulled him out by his feet.

Tr. Vol. I at

p. 153.
Officer Peterson testified that he then frisked Austin
and found a bloody knife in his pocket.

Id.

Once Austin is

arrested, Officer Peterson testified that he handcuffed him
and took him to Manson' s vehicle who had been sent to the
scene.

Tr. Vol. I pp. 122, 123, 157.

12

Manson testified that, as Austin was taken into custody,
he uttered the statement "Just shoot me."
123.

Tr. Vol. I at p.

Manson testified that he accompanied Austin to the

hospital to stitch a cut on his finger. Id.

The next day,

Officer Kent Green ("Green") testified that Austin asked him
if the man he stabbed died. When Green replied that Pratt had
died, he testified that Austin said, "Oh, Lord, please forgive
me.

I've killed a man." Tr. Vol. I at p. 173.

Green also

testified that Austin made several other statements to him
about what a terrible person he was.

Tr. Vol. I at p. 175.

On May 17, 2004, Austin was charged by Information with
Murder, a First-Degree Felony. R001-R002. On June 16, 2004,
in an Amended Information,
First-Degree

Felony;

Austin was charged with Murder, a

Aggravated

Robbery,

a

First-Degree

Felony; Obstruction of Justice, a Second Degree Felony; and
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.
R038-040.

On

Information,
Felony,

January

27,

2005,

in

a

Second

Amended

Austin was charged with Murder, a First-Degree

Aggravated

Robbery,

a

First-Degree

Felony,

and

Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.
R0111-R0113.
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On February 2, 3, and 4, 2005, this matter came to trial
before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson.

Tr. Vol. I and II at

p. 6. On February 4, 2005, Austin was found guilty of FirstDegree Murder, Theft

of an Operable Motor Vehicle, and

Interference with an Arresting Officer. Tr. Vol. II at p.157.
Austin waived his right to delay sentencing and on February 4,
2005, was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State
Prison on the charge of Murder in the First Degree with a
consecutive term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison
for Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle and six months on the
Interference with an Arresting Officer charge. Tr. Vol. II at
p. 172.
and

On February 4, 2005, this Court entered its

Commitment

to

Utah

State

Prison,

(hereinafter

"Judgement") in this matter (R0177-R0181).
2005 Austin filed his Notice

of

Appeal

Judgement
the

On February 10,

from the Judgement

entered with respect to this matter. (R0182-R0183).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court determined in a decision handed
down on June 7, 2005, that the element of "'obviate all
reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction
carried with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to
find guilt based

on

a degree

14

of proof below beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Reves, 2005 UT 33, 530. With such
a risk inherent in the use of the phrase "eliminate all
reasonable doubt," a juror may have found Austin guilty under
a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt,
violating Austin's due process rights under both the Utah
Constitution and United States Constitution.

Although not

specifically objected to at trial, this Court previously held
that the "[e]xceptional circumstances concept may be employed
as basis for reaching issues not properly preserved for
appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of
law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial."
State ex. rel. T.M., 2003 UT App. 191,
Pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

516, 73 P3d 959.

§76-3-401, a trial court has the

discretion to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant
has been convicted of more than one felony offense.
CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-401 (1) (2000).

See

UTAH

However, before a trial court

may impose consecutive sentences, it "shall consider the
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant."

Id §

76-3-401(2). The defendant has the burden to demonstrate that
the trial court did not consider the factors set forth in §
76-3-401 (2) . Helms at qri6.

15

ARGUMENT
I.

THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
FAILED TO ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW.

No person accused in the United States may be convicted
of a crime unless each element of the offense has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.

In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

362, 90 S. Ct. 1068 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added),
the United States Supreme Court has assigned this standard of
proof constitutional status, linking it to both the Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,

278 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 364.

xx

[T]he Due Process

Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship, 397
U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
The Utah

Supreme

Court

has

recently

overturned

holding in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219

its

(Utah 1997)

setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a
reasonable doubt jury instruction was improper.
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, II.

State v.

The first part of Robertson required

the instruction to indicate that the State must "obviate all
reasonable

doubt."

The original
16

concept

of this prong

appeared"...to derive from a fear that in ascertaining the
conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a
juror might misapply the ^beyond a reasonable doubt' standard
unless she is required to search out, confront, and defeat
reasonable doubt with evidence."

Reyes at ! 25.

The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and
determined to abandon it based on the fact that the element of
"obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the substantial
risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reyes at 1 30.

Utah Supreme Court undertook the following analysis:
125 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's
claim that the trial court erred when it failed to
expressly instruct that the State's proof must
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by
Robertson.
Id.
at 519.
The "obviate all
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice
Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d
1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
There,
Justice
Stewart
took
issue
with
an
instruction that equated "beyond a reasonable doubt"
with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge." Id.
He reasoned that since the standard to
be applied is "beyond a reasonable doubt," it
followed that any definition of the standard must
reference
the
obstacle-reasonable
doubt-to be
overcome by the evidence, and must convey the
principle that the State must surmount the obstacle
of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction.
Id.
The "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept appears
to derive from a feat that in ascertaining the
conviction of the truth of a charge against a
defendant, a juror might misapply the "beyond a
17

The

reasonable doubt" standard unless she is required to
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt
with evidence.
526 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's
image of "beyond a reasonable doubt" may be, his
suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate
all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque
and conceptually suspect.
Not every jury will
confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt.
The notion of
"obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof
is scant or lacking in credibility.
In these
instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of
their conviction concerning the strength of the
evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct
that requires jurors to identify doubts and assess
whether the evidence overcomes them. A universal
application of the notion that the State must
"obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only
by tying it to the concept of the presumption of
innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array
of inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must
overcome to attain a conviction, it follows that the
State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" in every
case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy
view of the presumption of innocence.
527 The process suggested by the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" standard is also flawed because,
contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that
respect violates the Victor
standard.
The
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a
testing of the validity of the doubt against the
evidence. This process suggests a back and forth
disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
"obviate" the doubt.
The "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard does not, however, condition a
conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability
either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason
for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State
18

has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as
a legitimate basis to acquit.
*8 528 To the extent that the Robertson
"obviate"
test would permit the State to argue that it need
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined,
the test works to improperly diminish the State's
burden.
Writing in the Notre Dame Law Review,
Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding
prominence of the requirement that doubts be
articulated. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses
of
Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof
Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003).
Professor Sheppard

summarized the central vice of this trend this way:
A troubling conclusion that arises from the
difficulties of the requirement of articulability is
that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on
the belief that the totality of the evidence is
insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity
implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an
obligation that appears focused on the details of
the arguments.
Yet this is precisely the
circumstance in which the rhetoric of the law,
particularly the presumption of innocence and the
state burden of proof, require acquittal. Id at
1213.
129 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of
the "obviate all reasonable doubt" element of
Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be
clearly
and fairly
communicated
through an
affirmative description of the degree of conviction
that must be attained by a juror based on the
evidence. We see little to be gained by including
within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction the
potentially confusing concept that every defendant
is entitled to a presumption of reasonable doubt,
which the State's evidence must obviate.
130 Because we conclude that "the obviate all
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson
test carries
with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond
a reasonable doubt, we expressly abandon it.
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Reyes at 5524-30.
In the

instant matter,

the

"reasonable

doubt" jury

instruction expressly indicates that "[i]t is the burden of
the State to eliminate

all

reasonable

doubt," which is

substantively the same as the prong in Robertson requiring the
jury instruction to state that the State must "obviate all
reasonable doubt." R14 9.

As indicated by the Utah Supreme

Court, this instruction carries with it the substantial risk
that a juror found Austin guilty based on a degree of proof
below beyond a reasonable doubt. With such a risk inherent in
the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a
juror may have found Austin guilty under a standard less than
that of beyond are reasonable doubt, violating Austin's due
process rights under both the

UTAH CONSTITUTION

and

UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION.

While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury
instruction was not preserved by trial counsel at the trial in
this matter, this Court should review the matter based upon
exceptional circumstances.

This Court has previously held

that the " [exceptional circumstances concept may be employed
as basis for reaching issues not properly preserved for
appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of

20

law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial."
State ex. rel. T.M. 2003 UT App 191, 516, 73 P.3d. 959. The
original decision was handed down by this Court in State v.
Reyes on January 15, 2004, upholding the three-part test in
Robertson, and the prong requiring the use of the language
"obviate all reasonable doubt."

2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 84.

Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in that matter in
May of 2004.

The trial in the instant matter was held

February 2-4, 2005, while review of Reyes was pending.
Opinion

by

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

in

State

The

v. Reyes,

abandoning the three-part test in Robertson was handed down on
June

7, 2005.

It

overturning an eight

is

clear

that

this

change

in law,

(8) year precedent in Robertson was

clearly an unsettled interpretation of the law that colored
the ability of Austin's trial counsel to raise the issue
surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY IN
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO
CONSECUTIVE TERMS WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.
A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Lehman, 2004 UT App. 404. This
Court traditionally affords the trial court wide latitude and
discretion in sentencing.

State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 18, 40
21

P.3d 626. "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing
when, among other things, it fails to consider all legally
relevant factors." Id atI8 (quotations and citation omitted).
Specifically, a trial court abuses its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences only if
take

the

view

by

the

x>

no reasonable [person] would

[sentencing]

court."

State

v.

Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 512, 84 P. 3d 854 (alterations in
original) {quoting

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah

1978)) .
Pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§7 6-3-4 01, a trial court has the

discretion to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant
has been convicted of more than one felony offense.
CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-401 (1) (2000).

See

UTAH

However, before a trial court

may impose consecutive sentences, it "shall consider the
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant."

Id §

76-3-401(2) . The defendant has the burden to demonstrate that
the trial court did not consider the factors set forth in §
76-3-401(2).

Helms at fl6.

In DeBose v. People, 175 Colo. 356, 488 P.2d 69, the
court

stated, "[t]he

Standards of Criminal

Justice have

recognized that multiple offenses may be punished, in the
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discretion of the trial judge, by consecutive sentences. The
Standards of Criminal Justice also suggest guidelines for the
imposition of consecutive sentences. American

Standards

of

Alternatives

Criminal

Justice

and Procedures,

Relating

Bar

Association

to

Sentencing

s 3.4 (iii) states that "[t]he

court should not be authorized

to impose

sentence until a presentence report

a consecutive

(sections

4.1—4.5),

supplemented by a report of the examination of the defendant's
mental, emotional and physical condition (section 4.6), has
been obtained

and

considered."

The United

States Code

addresses this issue as well under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584 (a),
where it states "[i]f multiple terms of imprisonment are
imposed on a defendant at the same time
run concurrently or consecutively

, the terms may

"

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, in
exercising its sentencing discretion, a district court must
consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a). U.S.
v. Rose, 185 F.3d 1108, C.A.10 (Okla.),1999. Section 3553(a)
states:

xx

...[t]he

court,

in

determining

the

particular

sentence to be imposed, shall consider— (1) the nature and
circumstances
characteristics

of

the

offense

of the defendant;
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and

the

history

(2) the need

and

for the

sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;. . ."
In this matter, Austin had originally pled guilty to the
charges and a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report had been
commenced. However, when Austin withdrew his guilty plea, the
report was stopped and never continued.
sentence
sufficient

Investigation
information

Report,
to

the

consider

Without a Pre-

court
all

of

was

without

the

factors

respecting his history, his remorse, and his rehabilitative
needs. When Austin was arrested, he showed immediate remorse
by telling officers who arrested him to "Just Shoot Me." Tr.
Vol. I at p. 123. The day after his arrest, Austin also asked
Green if the man he stabbed died, when Officer Green replied
xx

Yes", Austin said "Oh, Lord, please forgive me.

I've killed

a man." Tr. Vol. I at p. 17 3. Austin also made several other
statements to Green about what a terrible person he was. Tr.
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Vol. I at p. 175. At his sentencing Austin gave a statement
to the victim's family saying as follows:
I want to say to the family there's no part that I
could do that would fix it. Just I prayed over the
Whole thing. I don't know why this happened to your
beloved brother and your man. I regret very much
that this happened. I-with all my heart wish that
it had been me that day instead of him. It should
have been. It should have been me that day. But
some weird twist of fate changed everything. Words
just can't express my remorse for your loss. I'm
sorry.
Tr. Vol. II at p. 170.

This clearly shows that Austin was

remorseful over what he had done.
The trial court did not take into consideration Austin's
prior history or mental state. While there was a warrant out
for his arrest for a domestic violence incident in Colorado,
no other prior history of Austin was taken into consideration
by the trial court. His mother had been hospitalized and was
just put in a care facility, his marriage was falling apart,
he lost his job, and he has gone to visit his kids and his car
broke down.

Tr. Vol. I p. 142.

He had also decided to

overcome his addiction to methamphetamine.

Id.

When he

arrived home from seeing his kids he was going to face
everything—-his mother, his wife, his addiction—instead he
fell apart and attacked Pratt.

Tr. Vol. I p. 143.

He fell

apart because of emotional and mental stress he had been
25

suffering and the trial court abused its discretion by not
taking this matter into consideration.
State v, Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 Utah App.,1996, states that,
"[i]t is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to
bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from
raising it for the first time on appeal. [FN2] State
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State

v.

v. Archambeau,

Lopez,

820 P.2d

920, 922 (Utah App.1991). However, three exceptions to this
general rule are recognized in Utah. An appellate court may
address an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant
establishes that the trial court committed "plain error,"
State

v.

Archambeau,

Dunn,
820

850

P.2d

1201,

P. 2d

at

922; if

circumstances," id.;

1208-

09

there

(Utah

are

1993);

"exceptional

or in some situations, if a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal even
though, by reason of the claimed ineffectiveness, the matter
was not raised below. See State

v. Humphries,

818 P.2d 1027,

1029 (Utah 1991)
Austin maintains that his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the consecutive sentences. State v. Mecham, 9
P.3d 777

(Utah App.2000) states that, in order to prove

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
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"(1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and
(2) there exists a reasonable probability that absent the
deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more
favorable." See

Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-

88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
State

v. Brvant,
Austin's

consecutive

965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998)."
trial

counsel

sentences

should

as being

have

an abuse

objected
of

to the

the court's

discretion because, not only was there no pre-sentence report,
but his remorse and his emotional and mental state were not
taken into consideration.

Had his trial counsel objected, he

may have received concurrent sentence or been sentenced for a
lesser amount of time which would have been a more favorable
outcome for him.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,

based

upon

the

foregoing,

Appellant

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to
the trial court for a new trial.
DATED this

day of

, 2005.

William L. Schultz
Attorney for Graham Austin
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR ©RAND COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
Criminal No. 04X7-101
Held in the Courtroom of saia Court, at Moab, Grand
County, State of Utah/ on February 03/ 2005, present the
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge.
THE STATB OF UTAH,
Against:

GRAHAM WOODRUFF AUSTIN,
DOB: 03/25/1958
JUDGMENT AND COMHITMEBNT TO UTAH STATE PRISON

Happy J, Morgan, Grand County Attorney, for Plaintiff
xristine Rogers, Attorney at Law, for Defendant
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been
found guilty hy a jury of the offenses of:
COUNT 1; MURDER, a. FIRST DEGREE FELONY;
COUNT 2z THBFT OF AN OPBRAB&B MOTOR VHEICLE, a SECOND DEGREE
FELONY; and
COUNT 3: INTERF1EKENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER, a CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR;
1
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and the defendant stating to the Court that there is no legal
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as
follow©, to-witx

That you, GRAHAM WOODRUFF AUSTIN, are hereby

imprisoned as follows;
As to COUNT 1: You are hereby iftjprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON
for a term of MOT LESS THAN FIVE (5) YEARS BUT HAY BE FOR LIFE.
As to COUNT 2 M Y O U are hereby imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON
for a term of NOT t$BBS THAN ONE (1) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS.
As to COUNT 3: You ate hereby imprisoned in the GRAND COUNTY JAIL
for a texm of SIX

(6) MONTHS.

Said prison and jail terms are to be served
CONSECUTXVELY.

After defendant serves his terms in the Utah

State Prison he is to be returned to the Grand County Jail to
serve his term there.
The evidence at trial clearly convinced the court that
Walter Pratt stopped to provide assistance to defendant, whose
car had broken down at the side of the road.

Whether defendant

planned to murder the driver of the first car or decided to
murder him only after Walter Pratt refused to turn over the car

2
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this court does not taiow. Defendant did use a weapon uniquely
both concealable and deadly and he viciously attacked and killed
waiter pratt*

It appears that he considered returning to the

scene to eliminate witnesses who happened upon it, and* it is
evident that he pursued a woman with three, children, the primary
witnesses against him, for close to 20 miles before they managed
to evade him.

The court balievee defendant was motivated by a

need to get to where he could purchase methamphetamine.
The state has presented evidence that defendant
assaulted his first wife, and thatr a matter of days before these
crimes i he beat his second wife or mate so brutally that she
suffered permanent brain injury.

Defendant has consistently

presented a calm and subdued demeanor in court, and has professed
an understanding of the terrible nature of hie acts, but there is
ample «fevidence of defendant's brutal nature•

Defendant

compounded the gravity of his attaclc on Walter Pratt by
constructing an obviously false story about how Walter Pratt had
solicited a sexual act.

This subjected those who loved waiter

Pratt to further trauma solely for the purpose of advancing
defendant's effort at a lesser conviction*

in all of defendant's

conversations with law enforcement and in numerous letters to his
family describing his crime, he never proffered this explanation
3
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It surfaced only after hie attorney discovered

that there were women's underwear in Walter Pratt's camper.
while the court recognizes that the board of pardons
and parole faces many cases like this and must keep open the
prospect of rehabilitation est release, thi^ court counsels great
caution in believing that this defendant can ever be permitted to
live among his fellow humans again.
GRAHAK WOODRUFF AUSTIN, You are hereby REMANDED to the
custody of the Grand County Sheriff or other proper officer for
transfer to the custody of the Utah state Prison.
DATED this

day of February, 2005.
BY THE COURT r

/ #&****

lerson
frict Court Judge

* *
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day of February/

2005, I hand d e l i v e r e d or mailed, postage prepaid, a t r u e and'
c o r r e c t copy of the above t o t h e f o l l o w i n g ;
K r i s t i n e Rogers
Attorney f o r Defendant
712 Judge B u i l d i n g
8 Kast Broadway
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Department of Corrections
Adult Probation and Parole
courthouse f i l e
Grand County S h e r i f f
courthouse f i l e
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Addendum ~B~
Jury Instruction No. 7

INSTRUCTION NO.

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

This

presumption

follows

the

defendant

throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute
certainty.

It is the burden of the State to eliminate all

reasonable doubt.

Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason,

which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt
is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to

satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain
based upon the evidence in the case.

